Transition to the New Order Totally Explained

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Indonesia's transition to the "New Order" in the mid-1960s, ousted the country's first president, Sukarno after 22 years in the position. One of the most tumultuous periods in the country's modern history, it was the commencement of Suharto's 32-year presidency.
   Described as the great dalang ("puppet master"), Sukarno's position depended on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1965, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government and gained influence at the expense of the army. The army itself had become divided between a PKI-allied left-wing, and a right-wing courted by Western countries.
   On September 30, 1965 six of the military's most senior officers were executed in an attempted coup by the so-called 30 September Movement, a group from within the armed forces. Within a few hours, Major General Suharto, took control of the army and launched counteraction, and by the following day it was clear the poorly-coordinated coup had failed. Anti-communists, initially following the army's lead, went on a violent purge of suspected communists, killing an estimated half million people and destroying the PKI, which was blamed for the coup.
   The politically weakened Sukarno was out-manoeuvred and forced to transfer key political and military powers to General Suharto, who had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Indonesian parliament (MPRS) named General Suharto acting president. He was formally appointed president one year later. Sukarno lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970. In contrast to the stormy nationalism, revolutionary rhetoric, and economic failure that characterised the early 1960s under the left-leaning Sukarno, Suharto's pro-Western "New Order" stabilised the economy and created a strong central government. Widely praised for economic development, the "New Order" years were also condemned for its human rights record and corruption. According to Friend, "instead of filling [Indonesians'] stomachs, [Sukarno] tried to inflame their imaginations..." whereas Suharto went on to "...cultivate full bellies and empty spirits".

Prelude

Nationalist leader, Sukarno had declared Indonesian independence in 1945 and was appointed president. Following an internal national revolution and struggle against the former Dutch colonial masters, Sukarno had managed to hold together the disparate country, however, his administration hadn't been able to provide a viable economic system to lift its citizens out of severe poverty. He stressed socialist policies domestically and an avidly anti-imperialist international policy, underpinned by an authoritarian style of rule dependent upon his charismatic personality. These policies led him to create alliances with the Soviet bloc, People's Republic of China, and to pioneer the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement of post-colonial states at the Bandung Conference. It also created a domestic political alliance with the Communist Party of Indonesia.

Military split

These same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many enemies in the Western nations. These especially included the United States and United Kingdom, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno's nationalization of mineral, agricultural, and energy assets. In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction overlapping with the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Comintern of which it was a part.
When Sukarno rejected food aid from USAID leading to famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the rural population. In an attempt to curtail the right-wing military's increasing power, the Communist Party of Indonesia and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and other mass organizations.

Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

In 1963, a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the right-wing faction was largely absent from the conflict (whether by choice or orders of Sukarno isn't clear).
The Confrontation further encouraged the West to seek ways to topple Sukarno, viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the Domino Theory). The deepening of the armed conflict, coming close to all-out warfare by 1965, both increased popular dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime and strengthened the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close to the center of power in Jakarta.

"G30S" and retaliation

30 September-1 October 1965 six senior army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of soldiers from the Presidential Guard in an attempted coup. The left faction among the top generals was wiped out, including the powerful Army Chief of Staff, Ahmad Yani. The army thus fell to those more willing to stand up to Sukarno and the army's enemies on the left. Around 2,000 troops from coup group commanded occupied three sides Merdeka Square, and commanded the Presidential Palace, radio station, and telecommunications centre, but didn't occupy the east side, site of Kostrad headquarters. Calling themselves the "30 September Movement", the group announced on radio around 7am that they were trying to stop a CIA-backed military coup which was planned to remove Sukarno from power.
They claimed to have arrested several generals belonging to a conspiracy, the "Council of Generals", that had plotted a military coup against the government of President Sukarno. They further alleged that this coup was to take place on "Army Day" (October 5) with the backing of CIA, and that the Council would then install themselves as a military junta. Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a "Revolutionary Council" consisting of various well-known military officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet as invalid ("demisioner"). According to one chief conspirator Lieut-Col Latief, the Palace Guards hadn't attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI Angkatan Darat - the Army Strategic and Reserves Command), because he was considered a Sukarno loyalist. Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the counter-allegation that the G30S was a rebellious movement that sought to replace President Sukarno's government with a Communist government. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj-Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat - Army's Para-Commando Regiment).
During the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel soldiers had retreated back to Halim Base. RPKAD forces proceeded to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of October 2, but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the base. The next day, soldiers discovered the buried remains of the kidnapped generals. The corpses were exhumed, displayed to the press, and buried in a sombre ceremony on October 5, 1965.

Internal military power-struggle

After the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. However, on October 5 Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army Chief-of-Staff.
After the promotion, the New York Times reported that an unnamed Western "diplomatic report" alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto's alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power.
In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Major Gen. Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves) units were closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in charge of prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Pranoto was removed and Suharto was promoted to Army Chief-of-Staff on October 14, 1965.

Retaliatory campaign

The installation of Suharto as Army Chief-of-Staff established the right-wing faction's dominance of the Indonesian Army's command. In addition to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), this faction was also hostile toward Sukarno-loyalists, and the Chinese (both Chinese Indonesians as well as expatriates from the People's Republic of China).
On October 18, a declaration was read over the army-controlled radio stations, banning the Communist Party of Indonesia. The ban included the party itself, and its youth and women's wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI union. At the time, it wasn't clear whether this ban applied only to Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass arrest and summary executions, against suspected leftists and Sukarno loyalists.
The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and supervised by Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed at the Communist community and toward President Sukarno himself. The regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left to maintain order.

The Toppling of Sukarno

Violence and Massacres

At the funeral of Nasution's daughter Irma, Navy commander Admiral Martadinata gave Muslim leaders the signal to attack Communists. The next morning the PKI head office was ransacked and burned to the ground while firefighters stood idly by. They then marched demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party. The homes of senior party figures, including PKI chairman D.N. Aidit and Lukman and Nyoto were also torched. As Communist China was also blamed for involvement, anti-Chinese feeling grew. In the Sumatran city of Medan, the Chinese consulate was attacked, and there were anti-ethnic Chinese riots.
As the violence spread, Sukarno issued orders to try and stop it, but he was ignored. He also refused to blame the PKI for the coup, yet alone ban it as the Army demanded. However, although Suharto and Nasution were increasingly suspicious about Sukarno's role in the affair, the Army was reluctant to confront the president directly because of his still widespread popularity.
On 24 April 1966, Suharto gave a speech to members of the Indonesian National Party in which he spoke of the "three deviations" that would have to be corrected by the youth of the country in cooperation with the Armed Forces. These were:

The extreme-left radicalism of the Indonesian Communist Party and its efforts to impose a class struggle on the Indonesian people;

Political opportunism motivated by personal gain led and exploited by the "puppetmasters" of the Indonesian Central Intelligence Board (BPI), at the time led by Sukarno ally Subandrio;

Economic adventurism, resulting in the deliberate creation of economic chaos. The new regime turned away from China and began moves to end the "Confrontation" with Malaysia, in defiance of Sukarno's wishes. (New York Times, December 16, 1965.)

Consequences

Massacres

Beginning in later October 1965, the Indonesian army and its civilian allies (especially Muslim militia groups) began to kill members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In most cases the killings were one-sided. In most cases the authorities arrested party members and members and leaders of affiliated organizations and held them in detention for some time before sending them out to be killed over subsequent weeks and months. In some cases, the army and militias organized raids on suspected communist villages or hamlets, slaughtering all or most of the inhabitants. The estimates of the death toll of the conflict range from over 100,000 to 3 million, but most scholars accept a figure of around 500,000.

Political imprisonment

It is known that with Suharto's rise, surviving members of the Communist Party of Indonesia were branded tapol (short for tahanan politik or "political detainee"). During Suharto's reign, tapol were often given harsh prison sentences without trial, and their property was either seized or destroyed. Spouses, children, and relatives of tapol were subjected to guilt by association. To be branded a tapol meant a permanent outcaste status in Indonesian society, even after completion of a sentence; tapol have sued in modern times for restitution of their right to the franchise and for compensation for their losses.
Possible prison sentences included internal exile to penal colonies on desolate islands within the Indonesian archipelago. These included Buru island in the Moluccas. Among its more famous prisoners included author and PEN Freedom to Write winner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was imprisoned there for alleged membership in a Communist Party literary group, LEKRA. In a book of memoirs (The Mute's Soliloquy), Pramoedya made detailed allegations of forced labour, starvation, torture and other abuses within the colony. (Inside Indonesia, April-June 1999)

Anti-Chinese laws

While resentment toward Chinese Indonesians by indigenous Indonesians-descended peoples of the archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, the New Order instigated anti-Chinese legislation following the quashing of the Communists. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (both in Indonesia as well as Malaysia), but with the anti-Communist hysteria, the association of the Chinese Indonesians with the People's Republic of China caused them to also be viewed as a communist fifth column.
Indonesia's hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland China were severed, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta burnt down by a mob. New legislation included the banning of Chinese language signs on shops and other buildings, and the closure of Chinese language schools, adoption of "Indonesian" sounding names, and limits on Buddhist temple construction.

Military rule

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party eliminated one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It had placed third in a 1955 election. It was also among the largest Communist Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated 3 million members. Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, civilian government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the coup countermeasures.
In the place of civilian rule, a new system of military rule took hold, based on set-aside seats in the Parliament as well as the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine of the military, in taking the roles of both soldiers and administrators. The political parties not banned outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly known as Golkar. Though Suharto would later allow for the formation of two non-Golkar parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

Rise of Islamism

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a notable side effect of giving greater space for the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal, conservative, and extremist groups practicing Islam in Indonesia. It widely believed by observers of Indonesian history and politics that Suharto's forces whipped up anti-Communist sentiment in part by exploiting conservative Muslims' fears of "godless" Communism to instigate a jihad against the leftists.
As for more mainstream groups, conservative Islamic groups (called the "Central Axis") became a prop of the regime for some time after the change of regime. Liberal Islamic groups, on the other hand, are believed to have defected during the wave of protests before the Indonesian Revolution of 1998.

Improved ties with the West

The change in regime brought a shift in policy that allowed USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country. Suharto would open Indonesia's economy by divesting state owned companies, and Western nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The result was stabilisation of the economy and the alleviation of absolute poverty and famine conditions that had resulted from shortfalls in the rice supply and Sukarno's reluctance to take Western aid.
As a result of his elimination of the communists, Suharto would come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist. An ongoing military and diplomatic relationship between the Indonesia and the Western powers was cemented, leading to American, British, and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.

Revelations and mysteries

Four decades later, questions remain about the veracity of accounts of the events both leading up to and during the 30 September Movement provided by the Western governments and by Suharto. The ousting of the Suharto regime and beginning of the Reformation period in Indonesia and the end of the Cold War for the Western governments has allowed greater freedom of information, leading to a significant process of historical revisionism as well as the formation of conspiracy theories around the events of September 1965. Still, mysteries remain over the time period.

U.S. assistance to Suharto

Often cited by the left as evidence of a broader, international plot to topple Sukarno, a number of revelations were made by former employees of U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency regarding American actions around the time of the coup attempt.
Beginning in 1990, American diplomats divulged to the Washington Post and other media outlets that they'd compiled lists of Indonesian "communist operatives" had turned over as many as 5,000 names to military and intelligence loyal to Suharto. American journalist Kathy Kadane revealed the extent of the secret American support of some of the massacres of 1965-66 that allowed Suharto to seize the Presidency. She interviewed many former US officials and CIA members, who spoke of compiled lists of PKI operatives, which the Americans ticked off as the victims were killed or captured. They worked closely with the British who were keen to protect their interests in Malaysia. Sir Andrew Gilchrist cabled the Foreign Office in London saying: "…a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change". The PKI had won some popular support from the poor, it was this popularity, rather than any armed insurgency that alarmed the American government. Like Vietnam in the North, Indonesia might 'go communist'. (San Francisco Examiner May 20, 1990)
In 2001, the National Security Archive at George Washington University obtained several internal documents of the U.S. Department of State, bolstering the ambassadors' claims of American collaboration with Suharto. However, the National Security Archive claims that communications between Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been heavily redacted. A U.S. State Department cable indicates US government support for the military.

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